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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Insofar as the plaintiff has correctly stated 
the material facts of this case, the defendant agrees 
therewith. However, in view of the fact that the 
plaintiff's statement contains certain facts not in 
the record, and omits facts upon which the court 
below rendered it's Order, defendant finds it nec-
essary to make a brief additional statement. 
Plaintiff commenced this action by the service 
of Summons upon the defendant on April 11, 1955. 
Complaint and Return of Summons was filed April 21, 
1955. Defendant's Answer and Counterclaim was filed 
April 27, 1955. Plaintiff's Reply was filed May 12, 
1955. Subsequently, plaintiff filed a 1btion For 
Leave to amend his Complaint, but withdrew the same 
prior ·to any action by the Court below. An Order To 
Show Cause was served upon the plaintiff but he failed 
to appear (Tr. 57, Lines 25-26). Trial settine for 
November 28, 195.5, at 10 o:clock a.m. was made by 
the Court on November 7, 1955 and plaintiff's attor-
ney had notice of the same (Tr. 2, Lines 26-27-28). 
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On the day appointed for trial defendant and her 
counsel were present and announced ready. Neither 
plaintiff, nor his attorney, nor anyone in their 
behalf appeared. The Court proceeded with trial. 
In the meantime, and after defendant filed her 
Counterclaim, the plaintiff who commenced this action 
in the Court below, proceeded to the State of Nevada 
and commenced proceedings for divorce against the 
same defendant, filing his Complaint therein on Nove~ 
ber 1, 1955. On November 28, 1955, the plaintiff and 
his Nevada attorney, Joseph c. Heller, knew that the 
Utah Court had on that day granted a Decree of Divorce 
to the defendant and despite that knowledge proceeded 
to secure a divorce in Nevada, based upon the ques-
tionable service upon the defendant, on November 30, 
1955 (See Tr. Page 49, Lines 13 to 17, Tr. page 48, 
Lines 16 to 20). 
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Decree of Divorce by the Court below were filed on 
January 4, 1956. No Appeal or other proceeding for 
review was taken. 
On February 9, 1956, plaintiff, through his 
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attorney, filed a MOtion to Set Aside such Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce. 
This Motion was filed and based upon Rule 60 
(b), Subdivision 1, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
and was denied and overruled (See Tr. on App., Page 
55, Lines 9 to 30; Tr. on App., Page 56; Tr. on App., 
Page 57, Lines 1 to 2). 
The Court modified the original Order denying 
and overruling the said Motion, making his denial 
without prejudice in order to give the plaintiff an 
opportunity to re-submit his Motion and testify 
personally in behalf thereof, the plaintiff having 
failed to appear or testify at the time his Motion 
was heard and considered. 
In the plaintiff's Statement of Facts, many of 
the alleged assumptions have no material bearing on 
the issue, and while defendant does not agree with 
many of the assumptions therein stated, any answer 
thereto would be controversial, especially in view 
of the fact that neither the plaintiff nor the defen-
dant testified at the hearing, and the showing as 
pointed out by the lower Court was mainly upon 
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affidavits not supported by testimony. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE COURT BELOW PROPERLY AWARDED THE DECREE 
OF DIVORCE HERETI~ UPON THE DEFENDANT t S COUNT~CLAIM:. 
POINT II 
THE COURT BELOW PROPERLY DENlliD PLAINTIF'F 'S 
lviOTION TO SET ASIDE DIVORCE DECREE, AND DID NOT, IN 
SO DOING; ABUSE IT'S JUDICIAL DISGRESSION. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT BELOW PROPERLY AY/ARDED THE DECREE OF 
DIVORCE HEREIN UPON THE DEJ:t,ENDANT 1 S COUNTERCLATh1. 
PART I 
Plaintiff, in his first point, argues that there 
is a lack of jurisdictional facts to award a Decree 
of Divorce to the defendant under Section 3Q-3-l, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. It is to be 
noted that this claim was not made a part of the 
plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce. The 
Court below expressly found and set forth the juris-
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dictional data. This in effect is an Appeal from 
the Decree of Divorce itself, and under Rule 73 (a), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the time for appeal 
from said Decree of Divorce has expired. If the 
motion to vaca·te the judgment is filed after the 
expiration of the time for appeal from the judgment, 
an appeal from the Order denying the motion brings 
up for review only the Order and not the judgment 
(Saenz vs. Kenedy, CA5thj 178 Fed. 417). 
PART II 
Plaintiff argues that the Court could not grant 
the Decree of Divorce which it did because of lack 
of jurisdictional facts, and sets out in his brief 
portions of the transcript touching upon residence. 
Dating back to the time before Utah became a State, 
the law has always been that the residence of the 
plaintiff and not that of the defendant gives juris-
diction in divorce cases. Section 30-3-1, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended, expressly incorporates 
that principle of law:" •••••• where the plaintiff shall 
have been an actual and bona fide resident of this 
state and the county where the action is brought •••• ". 
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In the instant case, the plaintiff first invoked 
the jurisdiction of the Court by the service of 
Summons and filing his Complaint, wherein he set 
forth the requisites for jurisdiction based upon 
residence in divorce cases. The defendant was 
brought into Court, involuntarily, to answer the 
plaintiff's charges nade against her and sought the 
protection of her rights by way of counterclaim. In 
so doing, she submitted herself to the court se-
lected by the plaintiff. Now that the court of 
plaintiff's·choice has decreed against him, the 
plaintiff asserts that that Court was without juris-
diction so to do. Thus, the plaintiff, while claim-
ing all of his rights against the defendant, denies 
the right of the court to do justice to the defen-
dant and asks this Court to withhold the justice 
that was found due the defendant in a proceeding 
instituted by himself. He is dema~ding justice 
himself, but seeks to deny justice to his adversary 
(Fisk vs. Fisk, 24 Utah 333; 67 P. 1064). To fur-
ther argue this point, the holding of the court in 
the case of Charlton vs. Charlton, (Tex. Civ. App. 
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141 sw. 290) is respectfully submitted. 
" •••••• looking to the terms of the s·batute 
and construing the language used in the light of the 
reason and general purpose of it's enactment, we 
would be prepared to hold, in the absence of author-
ity, that the requirements of the statute as to resi-
dence were only intended to apply to the plaintiff-
- - - - m the language of the statute 'the peti·bion-
er for divorce', the person who puts the machinery 
of the Courts in motion in a divorce proceeding. The 
purpose of the statute was to protect, not only the 
defendant in divorce proceedings, but also the inter-
est of society, against fly-by-night divorce suits 
instituted by birds of passage, who, with no stabil-
ity of residence, might use the Courts to procure 
divorce upon false grounds, and sometimes by collu-
sion with the opposite party •••••• 
"We do not think that it vvas thought necessary, 
in order to effectuate this purpose, to make the same 
requirements, as to residence of a defendant in a 
divorce proceeding, unwillingly brought into Court, 
as is made of a plaintiff instituting the suit. The 
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general rules deduced from the authorities on this 
question is thus stated in 14 Cyc. p. 589: 'A 
statute making residence of plaintiff a prerequisite 
to the exercise of divorce jurisdiction does not 
preclude a non-resident defendant from filing a cross-
bill and obtaining a Decree of Divorce against plain-
tiff •••••• ' 
11The statement in the text is supported by the 
following authorities: Sterl vs. Sterl 2 Ill. app. 
223-2~.6; Jenness vs. Jermess 24 Ind. 355; 87 Am. 
Dec. 335; Glutton vs. Glutton 108 Mich. 267; 66 MV. 
52; Fisk vs. Fisk 24 Ut. 333; 67 P. 1064; Abele vs. 
Abele, 62 N.J. Eq. 644; 50 A. 686; Pine vs. Pine 
72 Neb. 463; 100 IDV. 938; Duke vs. Duke 70 N.J. Eq. 
149; 62 A. 471, 472 •••••• 11 
Included in the above enumerated authorities 
is the case of Fisk vs. Fisk, which recites the hold-
ing of this CourJG, and wh.ich remains the law of this 
State. After the plaintiff had filed his Complaint 
and returned his Summons against defendant for di-
vorce, thus invoking the Court's jurisdiction, the 
District Court had jurisdiction of the matters set 
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forth in the defendant's Counterclaim (Const. Ut. 
Art. 1, Sec. 11; Fisk vs. Fisk 24 Ut. 333, 67 P. 
1061~; Matt vs. Mott 82 Colo 413, 22 P. 1040; Howe 
vs. :tvloran 37 Nev._, 414; 142 P. 535). 
The jurisdictional facts are set out by the 
plaintiff in his Complaint; they are admitted by the 
defendant in her Answer, and the testimony of the 
defendant is an affirmation of the residence of 
plaintiff and defendant for a two year period before 
the Complaint was filed ( Tr. page 4) • To give any 
other interpretation to the testimony of the defen-
dant in this regard would be but a play on words. 
It certainly is not claimed by the plaintiff that 
in fact the plaintiff, or the defendant, was not an 
actual and bona fide resident as required by statute. 
Plaintiff claims the proof of the defendant is insuf-
ficient. It is respectfully submitted that the 
proof of the defendant is sufficient to sustain the 
allegations of plaintiff's Complaint as to residence. 
In answer to the question of how long defendant 
and her husband have been residents of Grand County, 
State of Utah, prior to the time the Complaint was 
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filed, the defendant answered, 11Vlfe first came out 
two· years ago. 11 ( Tr. page 4). Further, in answer 
to the following question:, "And you have been a 
resident of Grand County, State of Utah, t:b..ree months 
before the commencement of this action against you, 
is that ri gh t?11 the defendant answered: 11 Yes • 11 ( Tr. 
page 4). Is not the defendant's testimony, giving 
the co1mnon accepted meaning to the choice of words, 
proof that she and her husband resided in Grand Coun-
ty, U·bah, for a period of two years, and that such 
residence included the three months time.before the 
Complaint was filed? Must the witness be required 
to recite the exact wording of the statute - - tan 
actual and bona fide resident of this State of the 
County •••••• three months next prior to the commence-
ment of the action' - - - - in order to supply the 
jurisdictional facts. Must she be made to recite the 
statute in parrot fashion, or can she express herself 
in words of her own vocabulary and of equal import 
and meaning? In considering the testimony as a 
whole, there can be no question that the proof of 
the defendant is sufficient to meet jurisdictional 
1n 
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data re~uirements set forth in plaintiff's Complaint. 
The Court having made specific findings with reference 
to residence sufficient to meet jurisdictional require-
ments the controlling question is whether such find 
support in the evidence. We respectfully submit that 
it does, for this Court has already ruled that if 
there is any competent evidence in the record to 
support the court's findings, the judgment should not 
be disturbed (Buckley vs. Cox 247 P. 227). 
POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR NOR ABUSE IT'S JUDICIAL 
DISCRETION IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO SET 
ASIDE DIVORCE DECREE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF TEESE 
PROCEEDINGS. 
The plaintiff argues that the Court erred and 
abused it's Judicial Discretion in not giving him a 
chance to be heard, yet the plaintiff continues to 
remain away from Court. Plaintiff sought to set 
aside the Decree of Divorce on the grounds that 
through no fault of his own, he could not be present 
for the trial of his own cause, this because he did 
not have tLmely notice of the same. At the outset, 
ll 
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it is to be noted that under Rule 60 (b), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, " ••••••• the Court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a par·ty or his legal 
representative from a final judgment, order, or 
d . II procee lng •••••• Material -to this appeal is the 
legislative limitation upon the court's discretion, 
namely u •••••• in the furtherance. of justice •••••• 11 
Here is a plaintiff who starts an action for 
divorce in the Court below. The defendant timely 
Col.Ulterclaims against him. The plaintiff replies, 
then flees the jurisdiction of the court and starts 
another action for divorce in the court of a sister 
state. He turns his back on the Utah Court; fails 
to see his action through, then complains because 
he was not here to prosecute his own action. Rather, 
even after notice that the Utah Court had decreed, 
he defies it and secures, in his own behalf, a decree 
against the defendant by default. Armed 1vith a 
Nevada decree adjudicated to plaintiff's liking in 
the absence of ·the defendant, and at sorre two months 
interval, the plaintiff moves the Utah court to set 
aside it's Decree, claiming such relief is due him 
]_2 
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by Rule 60 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
based upon a question of fact, namely that plaintiff 
did not have notice of the trial of his cause, and 
thusly did not have his opportunity of being heard 
by the court. And to prove his good faith and inten-
tions, and to plead for a chance to be heard based 
upon that fact, plaintiff remained away from court 
and offered self-serving affidavits as proof of the 
same. The lower Court, mindful of it's duty to act 
in the furtherance of justice, was not satisfied with 
the showing of the plaintiff. The proof did not meet 
the standard requirements of evidence. At best it 
left the Court to resolve material matters through 
conjecture, surmise and partial disclosure. Is it 
not the exercise of sound discretion to require the 
plaintiff to support his motion with competent proof? 
Must the Court surrender without cause? The trial 
judge ·was honestly troubled with the character and 
nature of the proof presented. He begged for a 
sufficient showing, but received noneo This is borne 
out in the last words of the Court: 11 I will make 
this modification to my Order,:· I deny it w:L·bhout 
,~ 
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prejudice to your right to file another one. I 
will see what you are willing to show" (Tr. Page 
57-58). 
As stated in Thomas vs. Stevens (300 P2 811 
(Ida).) ''The facts constituting the mistake, in-
advertance, surprise or excusable neglect, upon 
which the moving party relies, must be detailed and 
made to appear; the conclusion of the party or his 
attorney is not sufficient. The question is one of 
fact for determination, in the first instance, by 
the trial court." 
The trial judge was not satisfied that the 
plaint~f was coming into court with clean hands and 
in good faith, was not satisfied he had no notice. 
All that plaintiff seeks - - - a chance to be heard -
- - - is s·till open to him under the Court's Order 
appealed from. All he need do is sustain his 
claimed position by proof and make manifest his 
intentions of letting justice make it's course. 
Could the Court below have acted with more judicial 
discretion than that? We think not. 
It is cownon understanding that a motion to 
-' 
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vacate a judgment is addressed to the sound discretion 
of the trial court, and that it's exercise of such 
discretion will not be disturbed on appeal except for 
abuse (Aaron vs. Holmes, 35 Utah 49; 99 P. 450). The 
fact that the movant has a meritorious clalin does not 
justify setting the judgment aside, if no good excuse 
for the default is shown, (Jackson vs. Rieser, 1940 
111 Fed. 2 310) and the merits of the controversy 
will not be considered unless an adequate reason for 
the default is shown (U.S. vs. Knox 79 Fed. Sup. 
714). These pronouncements are further jelled 
toward requiring sufficient and adequate showings 
on the part of the movant if there are intervening 
equities, such as the intervening Nevada divorce in 
the instant case. 
This Court in Warren vs. Dixon Ranch Co. (260 
P2 711) made the follo-wing enunciation: 
tt:The allov1ance of a vacation of judgment is a 
creatu~e of equity designed to relieve against 
harshness of enforcing a judgroont, which may occur 
through procedural difficulties, the -wrongs of the 
opposing party, or misfortunes which prevent the 
.. .J 
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presentation of a claim or defense. Rule 60 (b) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil ~rocedure outlines the situ-
ations wherein a party may be relieved from a final 
judgment, among which is mistake, inadvertence, sur-
prise, or excusable neglect claimed here by the 
appellant. Equity considers factors which may be 
irrelevant in actions at law, such as the unfairness 
of a party's conduct, his delay in bringing or con-
tinuing the action, the hardship in granting or 
den~~ng relief. Although an equity court no longer 
has complete discretion in granting or denying relief, 
it may exercise wide judicial discretion in weighing 
the factors of fairness and public convenience, and 
this Court on appeal will reverse the trial court 
only where an abuse of this discretion is clearly 
shown (Salt Lake Hardware Co. vs. Nielson Land & 
Water Co., 43 Utah h06, 134 P. 911; McVJhirter vs. 
Donaldson, 36 Utah 293~ 104 P. 731). 
In Peterson vs. Crosier, (29 U. 235; 81 P. 860), 
this Court held:: tt •••••• the rnovan"'G must show that he 
used due diligence and ·that he was prevented from 
appearing by circumstances over which he had no 
..,/ 
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control." In the instant case, the circumstances 
attendant t.o plaintiff's non appearance were of his 
own making and under his complete controlo Never-
theless, in attempting to meet the requirements of 
Peterson vs. Crosier, supra, plaintiff submits the 
affidavit of his Nevada attorney and his ovm a£fi-
davit. These constitute his sho·vving. It would appear 
that in the case of Warren vs. Dixon Ranch Co. (260 
P2 711) the shov1ing was by affidavit of a former 
attorney and that of one of the parties. In 
deciding the ·vvarren vs. Dixon case (supra) thi.s 
Court held: 
urn order for this Court to overturn 
the discretion of the lower Court in 
refusing to vacate a valid judgment, 
the requirements of public policy de-
mand more than a mere statement ·t;hat 
a person did not have his day in Court 
when full opportunity for a fair hear-
ing was afforded him or his legal 
representative. 11 
Here, plaintiff's own departure, his filing anew for 
17 
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divorce in Nevada, his choice to see the Nevada 
action through even after notice that the Utah 
Court had rendered judgment, his indifference to the 
Utah decree for more than t·wo months, would all 
indicate positive performance on the part of the 
plaintiff tovtard an abandonment of the Utah court, 
rather than acts consti tu·tiing excusable neglect. 
Under such circumstances could not the trial court 
be justified in believing that the plaintiff had 
abandoned his action? "This Court will not reverse 
the trial Court where it appears that all elements 
were considered, merely because the motion could have 
been granted. This Court will not substitute it's 
discretion for that of the trial Court in a case such 
as this." (Viarren vs. Dixon Ranch Co. 260 P2 711). 
In the instant case the record reveals that the 
trial court; considered all of the elements involved, 
and that in so doing was constrained to deny the lvlo-
4 
tion of the plaintoff. We respectfully submit that 
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CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that the facts and the 
applicable law relating to both procedure and the 
conduct of the plaintiff controlling his equitable 
en·t.itlement, fully sustain and uphold the Order of 
the trial court, and that the same should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON & HUGGER! 
19 
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